By robertsmith

• May 9, 2020
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By Kwabena Frimpong Mensah Esq.*

INTRODUCTION

Disputes and in effect litigation, are aspects of life that have been in existence since the days of old. The earliest form of a dispute is seen in the Bible in Genesis Chapter 13 versus 5-8 where a dispute arose between Abram and Lot over who should occupy the land which they found themselves on.

As is common within the practice, there are instances where the pleadings in a suit do not disclose a cause of action against a party. There would also be instances where the whole action was instituted with the aim of litigating a dispute, the merits of which had previously been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.  

What then can a litigant in that situation do? Are there any remedies available to a party who is being vexed twice? And if there are any remedies, how does the litigant access these remedies? Does litigation does truly come to an end?

The purpose of this article would be to give a step by step account of what legal practitioners can do when their clients are faced with such challenges. This article will take into account the respective provisions of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, C.I 47 and decided cases of the Ghanaian Courts.

THE COURTS JURISDICTION STRIKE OUT PLEADINGS

The power granted the courts to strike out a pleading for not disclosing a cause of action is exercised in two main ways, either under the provisions of the rules of the High Court (C.I. 47) or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
Though both means give the same results, the two employ different methods at reaching the desired result.

The inherent jurisdiction is a doctrine of the English common law under which a superior court has the jurisdiction to hear any matter that comes before it, unless a statute or rule limits that authority or grants exclusive jurisdiction to some other court or tribunal. In the case of Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corporation Ltd[1], Lord Diplock described the court's inherent jurisdiction as a general power to control its own procedure to prevent the court from being used to achieve injustice.

In like manner, the case of Standard Chartered Bank (Gh) Ltd v. Western Hardwood Ltd,[2] held that aside its general jurisdiction, a superior court has an inherent jurisdiction to correct its own errors in order to prevent abuse of processes and to ensure convenience and fairness when such errors are brought to its attention, irrespective of who presides over the court.

The jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfil itself as a court of law. The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner

The High Court is empowered under the rules of Court by Order 11 Rule 18(1) to strike out pleadings in certain situations.
The order reads as follows
“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleadings or anything in any pleading to be struck out on the grounds that; (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly.

The order further provides that
“No evidence whatsoever shall be admissible on an application under subrule (1) (a).”

On the hearing of an application to strike out a pleading brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court for disclosing no cause of action, if the application is successful, the court would go ahead to dismiss an action.

As already stated, though both are similar in effect, there is a fundamental difference between an application to strike out a pleading either under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or under the Rules of Court. 

“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleadings or anything in any pleading to be struck out on the grounds that; (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly.

The order further provides that
“No evidence whatsoever shall be admissible on an application under subrule (1) (a).”

On the hearing of an application to strike out a pleading brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court for disclosing no cause of action, if the application is successful, the court would go ahead to dismiss an action.

As already stated, though both are similar in effect, there is a fundamental difference between an application to strike out a pleading either under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or under the Rules of Court. 

The jurisdiction of the High Court to strike out any pleading is invoked by an application to the court. The application may be brought solely under Order 11 Rule 18 of C.I 47 or under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court or both.
Paragraph 436 of the Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed), Vol 37 provides that
"The application may be made, and frequently is made, both under these grounds and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court and a properly drawn application should invoke both powers”.

In the case of Okofoh Estates Ltd v. Modern Signs Ltd[3] the apex court of the land speaking through Akuffo JSC (as she then was) stated as follows
"It, therefore, seems to me that, in view of the clear differences in the established practices and procedures for invoking the two powers, the two cannot be considered to be interchangeable or simultaneous, unless they are both specifically applied for".

At Common law, there was no requirement to state that an application was being brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Vinson V The Prior Fibres Consolidated Ltd[4], it was stated that a properly drawn application would invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court; there was no need to title it “Inherent Jurisdiction[5]".

Where the application does not state the rule under which the application is brought the courts, have been minded to look at the substance of the application to determine which of its jurisdiction is being invoked.

In the Okofoh Estates case supra, the court stated
“Consequently, in a situation such as this, where the notice of motion before the High Court made no clear reference to the rule or procedure under which the application was being made, it becomes necessary for the court to ascertain first which of its powers is being invoked and therefore which procedure is to be applied, and the most practical manner in which it will be possible to discern the properly applicable practice will be to examine the specific words used in formulating the grounds for the application.

This principle is further asserted in the case of Asamoah v. Marfo[6] where it was held that
“The practise is that in an application by motion to a court, it is desirable for counsel filing the motion to indicate the order and the rules of court under which the application is brought. It is, however, not mandatory that counsel for the applicant should state the order and rule under which an application is brought. However, the relief sought must be clear and apparent on its face.”

Though this principle of the law remains unchanged, it would be prudent for the motion paper to be indorsed with which of the jurisdictions of the court is being invoked i.e. either the jurisdiction of the court conferred by the rules of court or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court or both.  

THE DIFFERENCE IN INVOKING EITHER OF THE JURISDICTIONS OF THE COURT

An application to strike out a pleading as earlier stated may be brought under the High Court Rules, the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Courts or both. The difference, however, is found in the procedure to be applied when invoking the various jurisdictions of the court in respect of the application.  

Where an application to strike out pleadings is brought under Order 11 rule 18 (1) (a)i.e.  for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, the application must not be supported by any form of evidence, as such evidence is  inadmissible. The courts of the land have interpreted evidence as used in order 11 rule 18(2) to include affidavits[7]. The courts stated that in such applications the cause of action or lack thereof must be discernible on the face of the pleadings itself.  The reasoning for this is that it must be clear from the pleadings that none of the facts pleaded that shall entitle a Plaintiff to a remedy against the Defendant. The Court in the case of Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd[8] speaking through Taylor J( as he then was) stated that
“Under the rules, in an application to set aside the writ and statement of claim, the court is to decide the question by examining the said statement of claim and the writ and nothing else. … I only want to make one remark about Order 25 rule 4[9]. It seems to me that when there is an application made to strike out a pleading, and you have to go to extrinsic evidence to shew that the pleading is bad, that rule does not apply. It is only when upon the face of it is shewn that the pleading discloses no cause of action or defence, or that it is frivolous and vexatious, that the rule applies. In this case it is manifest that you must go to extrinsic evidence to shew that the pleading is bad, and directly it comes to that, the rule does not apply”


A cause of action was defined in the case of Davey v. Bentick.[10] In Davey v. Bentick (supra), the court held that for a cause of action to lie, the pleadings must raise some question no matter how small or weak to be decided. This definition is further expanded in the case of Letang v. Cooper[11] per Lord Diplock as a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against another.

Now, this may cause some confusion especially where there is more than one paragraph in a pleading under attack. The court has been of some aid in this respect by providing that the applicant may on the face of the motion paper state the offending paragraphs in the pleading which the applicant wishes to have struck out.
This point is further expanded in the case of Harriet Morrison v. The Registered Trustees Victory Bible Church International.[12] The court speaking through Gbadegbe JSC stated that it was a procedural lapse not to state the paragraphs the Applicant seeks to have to struck out. He further stated that it was contrary to settled practice not to state the grounds on which the application is being brought. At page 82 of the report, Gbadegbe JSC continued by stating that
“the Applicant is required to specify the grounds in the body of the motion paper and not cause the Respondent thereto and indeed the court to search for the grounds from the affidavit in support of the application”.

For practicality sake and in line with the decision in Harriet Morrison (supra), would the same purpose not be satisfied if the would-be Applicant swore to an affidavit highlighting the offending paragraphs which he seeks to have struck out?

This school of thought is appreciated by some justices of the High Court. In the case of Medea Development S.A v. Kolak Mining Limited & Anor[13] on the hearing of a preliminary legal objection to an application to dismiss a suit brought under Order 11 rule 18(1)(a)[14] the Honourable Justice was  of the view that where the affidavit specified the pleadings under attack and no more, the inclusion of the affidavit to the motion paper did not offend the provisions in Order 11 rule 18 (1) (a). The Justice further opined that such as circumstance would be a proper case in which the courts should be guided by the principle of substantive justice to consider the substance of the application rather than its form.
The Honourable Justice stated
"...The Applicant’s affidavit specifies the exact pleadings under attack. I will also concede that the same does no more than specify the pleadings under attack and the grounds for attacking same. It does not invite this court to look beyond the allegations contained in the Plaintiff’s pleadings. I therefore think this is a proper case in which the Court ought to be guided by the principle of substantial justice to consider the substance of the application rather than the form. In other words, 1^st Defendant’s application ought not to be thrown out merely because an affidavit has been filed in support of same when the substance of the affidavit is only to specify the pleadings its seeks to have struck out”

Where the application is brought under sub-rules 1(b), (c) and (d) of Order 11 rule 18 affidavits and affidavit evidence is admissible.  

In an application brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court to strike out pleadings, however, affidavit evidence is admissible, even where the grounds for the application is that no reasonable cause of action has been disclosed by the pleadings.  The Court's power under its inherent jurisdiction is to ensure that the court processes are not abused and every application brought under that jurisdiction must allude to that fact that the Respondent by that action is seeking to abuse the court process. The High Court is granted power under its inherent jurisdiction to summarily determine suits.

Where an application is brought under both the rules of Court and under the inherent jurisdiction, the court is to apply the rules governing the invocation of both jurisdictions in determining the application. In the case of Gbenartey & Glie v. Netas Properties And Investments & Other[15]  the apex court of the land speaking through Anin Yeboah JSC (as he then was)  stated that in relation to applications of this nature brought under both jurisdictions that
“… when both are invoked together, the court is allowed to receive extrinsic evidence as it has been the practice both under the old rules.”

Once these procedures have been followed, the applicant will be deemed to have properly invoked the High Court’s Jurisdiction with respect to striking out pleadings.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF AFFIDAVITS IN APPLICATIONS UNDER ORDER 11 RULE 18(1) (A) OF C.I. 47

The general rule is that every motion is supported by an affidavit setting out the facts upon which the application is grounded. This is however not absolute as the rules provide for instances where affidavits are not required. 

Order 19 Rule 4 of the High Court Civil Procedure rules provides that every application shall be supported by affidavit deposed to by the applicant or some person duly authorised by the applicant and stating the facts on which the applicant relies, unless any of these Rules provides that an affidavit shall not be used or unless the application is grounded entirely on matters of law or procedure which shall be stated in the motion.
An example of such an application which does not require a supporting affidavit in the Application for Directions as found in Order 32 of C.I 47. Another example is provided in Order 19 rule 4 which provides that an affidavit shall not be used where the application is grounded entirely on matters of law or procedure.
The oft example of an application which requires no affidavit is Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) but is that really the case? Order 11 rule18(2) of C.I 47 states that
“No evidence whatsoever shall be admissible on an application under subrule 1(a).”

It is interesting to note that the order does not make mention of an affidavit not being admissible. The High Court Civil Procedure rules do not provide a definition of what constitutes evidence as such, recourse has to be made to the Evidence Act. In section 179 of the Evidence Act[16], evidence  is defined as testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or non-existence of a fact.

The next question to be answered is do affidavits in this context constitute evidence. In answering this question, we shall have recourse to the other provisions of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules; the linguistic cannons of interpretation and the presumptions ancillary to the interpretation of statutes.

In interpretation of statutes, there is the presumption that words or phrases used in the statutes or documents have the same meaning and where different words are used in the document or Statute. they have different meanings[17]. This presumption was upheld in the case of BCM Ghana Ltd v. Ashanti Goldfields Ltd[18] where the court stated
“It is a settled rule of construction that though generally speaking the same word bears the same meaning, it is a rebuttable presumption”.

There is also the presumption that the law maker does not make mistakes. The Law maker is careful about his choice of words, punctuations’ and does not make mistakes[19].

How do these principles tie in with interpreting the word “evidence” used in Order 18 rule 2?
As already stated that per order 19 rule 4 every application shall be supported by an affidavit unless the rules otherwise direct. The effect of the word “shall” is clearly stated in section 42 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 Act 792 as being mandatory.

Applications are used to show the facts on which a person brings an application. In Order 4 rule 5(4) of C.I 47 a person seeking to seeking to have a person joined shall file an application supported by an affidavit showing the intended parties interest in the matter. Under Order 14 rule 2 of the rules, an application for summary judgment must be supported by an affidavit verifying the facts on which the application is based.  This is how affidavits are used under the rules.

In defining what constitutes evidence under C.I. 47,  Order 38 rule 3(2) of C.I. 47[20]  which is titled evidence of particular facts, details what is considered evidence when proving the existence or other wise of a fact. These are;

1. by a statement on oath of information;
2. by the production of documents or entries in books;
3. by copies of documents or entries in books or in the case of a fact which is or was a matter of common knowledge either generally or in a particular district;
4. by the production of any publication of general circulation which contains a statement of that fact.

It can thus be inferred from the drafting of Order 11 rule 18(2) that the law maker did not intend that applications brought under Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) do not come with a supporting affidavit. If the lawmaker had this in mind it would have stated so emphatically by using the word affidavits and not evidence.

The Courts have admonished persons not to ascribe meanings to words to statutes aside the ordinary meaning those words carry. In the case of Kumnipah II v. Ayirebi & Others[21] the courts stated,
"In the absence of a clear necessity, it is not right to read into an enactment words which are not there”. 

It is the opinion of the writer that in light of the difference in the use of the words affidavit and evidence in the rules, it cannot be said that the affidavits were meant to be inadmissible under Order 11 rule 18(1)(a) of C.I 47.
As stated by Gbadegbe Jsc in the Morrison case (supra) an application to strike out a pleading must satisfy certain crucial requirements without which a court may not be minded to hear the application. The Applicant is required to specify the grounds in the body of the motion paper and not cause the Respondent thereto and indeed the court to search for the grounds from the affidavit in support of the application.
The affidavit may contain paragraphs which highlight the offending paragraphs and leave it at that. Such an affidavit would also be devoid of any exhibits attached which may be considered evidence.
Such an affidavit will not be considered evidence for the purposes of the rule.

MUST A DEFENDANT ENTER APPEARANCE BEFORE BRINGING AN APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 11 RULE 18?

Once a writ of summons with its accompanying statement of claim is served on a Defendant, the next step is for the Defendant to enter an appearance to the suit either by himself or through an appointed lawyer. Where after the review of the writ and statement of claim, the Defendant may elect to apply to have the suit dismissed for any of the reasons provided under Order 11 Rule 18 of C.I. 47.

The issue that has commonly risen in the practice has been in such a situation is which type of appearance a party should enter - whether an unconditional one or a conditional one; and whether the entry of a conditional appearance disentitles a person from applying to strike out pleadings or to have a suit dismissed.

Under the rules of court, a party may enter an unconditional appearance to a suit or a conditional appearance under Order 9 rule 7 of C.I 47.  The entry of an unconditional appearance means that the Defendant wholly submits to the jurisdiction of the court and that there are no issues with the issuance or service of the writ or the jurisdiction of the court.

The Defendant may elect to enter a conditional appearance. The entry of a conditional appearance gives the Defendant the right to apply to either set aside the writ, set aside the service of the writ or declare that the writ or notice of it has not been served on the Defendant or to discharge any order that gives leave to serve the notice of the writ on the Defendant outside the country[22].

In the case of Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo[23] the court quoting from the 1969 White Book Part 1 defined what a conditional appearance was as follows
"The term `conditional appearance' means an appearance in qualified terms, reserving to the appearing defendant the right to apply to the Court to set aside the writ, or service thereof, for an alleged informality or irregularity which renders either the writ or service invalid or for lack of jurisdiction…… A conditional, appearance or appearance under protest is a complete appearance to the action for all purposes[24], subject only to the right reserved by the defendant to apply to set aside the writ or the service thereof, on any ground which he can sustain. A defendant has the right to appear conditionally where he has a bona fide intention to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court.”

In the practice, the common question that surfaces is, does the entry of a conditional appearance disable a defendant from applying to strike out a suit, or any other application for that matter? The basis for this question has been a reference to the oft-cited case of R v. High Court, Accra ex parte Aryeetey[25]. In the said case it was held in holding 3 as follows
“A conditional appearance was to enable a defendant who intended to object to the issue or service of a writ or notice of a writ on him, or the jurisdiction of the court, to apply to the court to set aside the writ or notice of the writ or the service thereof on him. Such an application might encompass any irregularity or defect in the issue or service of the writ or notice of the writ. Thus, it was not permissible for a defendant who had entered a conditional appearance to move the court to have the writ set aside because he had a legal defence, even if unimpeachable, to the action. Accordingly, such an application was not available to the respondent who after entering a conditional appearance to the applicant's writ at the High Court sought to rely on a plea of res judicata since that plea, to be successful, had to satisfy certain requirements which could only be revealed through evidence. Moreover, the respondent had no right to apply to set the applicant’s writ aside because he had a good defence to the action.”

Armed with this holding many a judge and practitioner have refused to accept that a party who has entered a conditional appearance may apply to have pleadings struck out and have the action dismissed.

For the purpose of this article, we shall take a look at all the provisions of the rules and the case law to see the practicality of this position. Could it be the lawmaker’s intention to bar a Defendant, from making any applications after the entry of a conditional appearance, I would think not.

It is trite learning that in interpreting statutes the relevant section must be read as a whole and not in isolation to garner the intent of the lawmaker. Order 9 rule 7 of C.I 47 titled ‘conditional appearance’ provides that:
(a) A Defendant may file a conditional appearance
(b) A conditional appearance, except by a person sued as a partner of a firm in the name of that firm and served as a partner, is to be treated for all purposes as unconditional appearance unless the Defendant applies to the court within the time limited for the purpose, for an order under rule 8 and the court makes an order under that rule.

Order 9 rule 8 provides that “A Defendant may at any time before filing appearance or if the Defendant has filed a conditional appearance, within fourteen days after filing appearance apply to the Court for an order to set aside the writ, set aside the service of the writ or declare that the writ or notice of it has not been served on the Defendant or to discharge any order that gives leave to serve the notice of the writ on the Defendant outside the country.”

It is also provided by section 42 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 that the word “may” when used in a statute is always permissive and not mandatory.

Reading of Order 9 rules 7 and 8 together, the inference that can be drawn is that unless a Defendant intends to apply for any of the remedies provided under Order 9 Rule 8, a conditional appearance is treated as an unconditional appearance for all intents and purposes, further a Defendant after the entry of a conditional appearance is not mandated to apply to have the writ set aside.   

In the case of Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo (Supra) the court stated that where a conditional appearance is filed and the party does not apply to set aside the writ or service of the writ the appearance will be treated as unconditional for the purpose of any application. The Court stated as follows
“Her grievance is not among those which justify her entering a conditional appearance, the conditional appearance therefore is out of place and will be treated as unconditional appearance which would entitle her to present her application under Order 25, r. 4”[26].

Order 11 rule 18 of C.I. 47 provides that “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order any pleadings or anything in any pleading to be struck out on the grounds that;
(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence;
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;
(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly. “

The plain ordinary meaning of the words “at any stage of the proceedings” is to be construed to mean at any time after the issuance of the writ and statement of claim, and in the case of a Defendant seeking to have an action stayed or dismissed right after the filing of an appearance such an application may be brought. The provisions of the said order do not limit the application to one which can be brought by only a Defendant who has entered an unconditional appearance to a suit.

The High Court has power under its inherent jurisdiction to summarily terminate proceedings for being vexatious, frivolous or an abuse of the court process. In this same vein where applications to dismiss a suit, are brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court the rules of court do not apply and issues of the form of appearance do not matter. In the case of  R v. High Court, Accra ex parte Aryeetey[27] the court admitted this fact in holding 4 where it stated
“…….However, unlike its power under Order 25, r 4 of LN 140A the court in the exercise of the power under its inherent jurisdiction could consider all the facts, including affidavit evidence. Accordingly, although in the instant case the respondent might not be entitled after entry of his conditional appearance to ask the court to strike the applicant’s writ and statement of claim on the ground that his action was vexatious, scandalous and an abuse of the process of the court, since the trial High Court justice found the applicant’s application “a serious abuse of the court”, she was justified in exercising the court’s inherent jurisdiction in summarily terminating the proceedings”.

Tying this in with the fact that an application to strike out pleadings/dismiss a suit may be brought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court and under the rules, it can be inferred that the entry of a conditional appearance does not prevent a Defendant from applying to dismiss the suit under Order 11 rule 18 of CI 47

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion it is the writers hope that the state of the law with respect to the admissibility of affidavits in Applications brought under Order 11 Rule 18(1)(a) will reviewed to provide clarity to all practitioners. The writer is of the opinion that in using the word “evidence” in Order 11 rule 18(2) the law maker did not intend to exclude the use of affidavits.

The writer will conclude with short checklist for use by all practitioners seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction under Order 11 rule 18(1)(a).

1. The form of the appearance entered has no bearing on the success or otherwise of the application
2. Though the application may be brought at any time, it must be brought timeously[28].
3. The motion paper should state the rule/jurisdiction which the Defendant is invoking or where it is both the inherent jurisdiction and the rules of court motion paper should clearly state that.
4. The application must state the specific pleadings which are being sought to be struck out.

Footnotes
* The author is an Associate at Robert Smith and Adelaide Law, A boutique law firm based in Accra. I would like to thank Bobby Banson, Esq Lead Consultant  at Robert Smith and Adelaide Law for his  invaluable contribution and immeasurable support in writing this article.

[1] [1981] AC 909
[2] [2009] SCGLR 196 @ 201
[3]1995-96 1 GLR 310 at 328
[4] 1906 W.N. 200
[5] This was followed in the Ghanaian case of HARLLEY v EJURA FARMS [1977] 2GLR 179
[6] [2011] 2SCGLR 832
[7] See the case of Okai v Okoe [2003-04] SCGLR 393.
[8] [1977] 2 GLR 179-222
[9] Order 25 Rule 4 of LN140A is in pari material with order 11 rule 18(1) (a) of C.I 47
[10] 1893 1 QB 185
[11][ 1964 ]3 WLR 573
[12] (Civil Appeal No:J4/16/2014) dated 14^th January, 2015
[13] Suit No CM/BDC/1243/2019
[14] Ruling was delivered on 28^th October, 2019.
[15] [2015-2016] SCGLR 605 at 617
[16] 1975 NRCD 323
[17] Modern Law of Interpretation in Ghana, 2015 Revised Edition page 273
[18] 2005-06 SCGLR 602
[19] Modern Law of Interpretation in Ghana, 2015 Revised Edition pages 273-275
[20] It is interesting to note that this is in pari material with the definition of evidence as provided in section 179 of NRCD 323
[21]  [1987-88] 1 GLR 265–287
[22] Order 9 rule 8 of C.I 47
[23] 1973 GLR 490 -500
[24] Emphasis mine
[25][ 2003-04] SCGLR 398
[26] Order 25 rule 4 of LN 140A is the same as Order 11 rule 18 of C.I. 47
[27] [2003-04] SCGLR 398
[28] Gbenartey & Glie V Netas Properties And Investments & Other [2015-2016] SCGLR 605 at 617

[1] [1981] AC 909
[2] [2009] SCGLR 196 @ 201
[3]1995-96 1 GLR 310 at 328
[4] 1906 W.N. 200
[5] This was followed in the Ghanaian case of HARLLEY v EJURA FARMS [1977] 2GLR 179
[6] [2011] 2SCGLR 832
[7] See the case of Okai v Okoe [2003-04] SCGLR 393.
[8] [1977] 2 GLR 179-222
[9] Order 25 Rule 4 of LN140A is in pari material with order 11 rule 18(1) (a) of C.I 47
[10] 1893 1 QB 185
[11][ 1964 ]3 WLR 573
[12] (Civil Appeal No:J4/16/2014) dated 14^th January, 2015
[13] Suit No CM/BDC/1243/2019
[14] Ruling was delivered on 28^th October, 2019.
[15] [2015-2016] SCGLR 605 at 617
[16] 1975 NRCD 323
[17] Modern Law of Interpretation in Ghana, 2015 Revised Edition page 273
[18] 2005-06 SCGLR 602
[19] Modern Law of Interpretation in Ghana, 2015 Revised Edition pages 273-275
[20] It is interesting to note that this is in pari material with the definition of evidence as provided in section 179 of NRCD 323
[21]  [1987-88] 1 GLR 265–287
[22] Order 9 rule 8 of C.I 47
[23] 1973 GLR 490 -500
[24] Emphasis mine
[25][ 2003-04] SCGLR 398
[26] Order 25 rule 4 of LN 140A is the same as Order 11 rule 18 of C.I. 47
[27] [2003-04] SCGLR 398
[28] Gbenartey & Glie V Netas Properties And Investments & Other [2015-2016] SCGLR 605 at 617